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1Abstract
Despite the importance of supplier inducement and brand loyalty in
the drug purchasing process, little empirical evidence is to be found
with regard to the inﬂuence that these factors exert on patients’ deci-
sions. Under the new scenario of easier access to information, patients
are becoming more demanding and even go as far as questioning their
physicians’ prescription. Furthermore, new regulation also encourages
patients to adopt an active role in the decision between brand-name
and generic drugs. Using a stated preference model based on a choice
survey, I have found evidence of how signiﬁcant physicians’ prescrip-
tion and pharmacists’ recommendation become throughout the drug
purchase process and, to what extent, brand loyalty inﬂuences the ﬁ-
nal decision. As far as we are aware, this paper is the ﬁrst to explicitly
take consumers’ preferences into account rather than focusing on the
behavior of health professionals.
Keywords: Brand loyalty, demand inducement, drug price elasticity,
discrete choice experiment.
JEL codes: I11, D12, C28, C93.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purchase of pharmaceutical drugs is more than a ”purchasing act in
itself” because it involves a multi-stage process in which, ﬁrstly, a physician
writes a drug prescription, secondly, a pharmacist dispenses and substitutes
and, ﬁnally, a patient consumes. The existence of information asymmetries
between physicians and patients and uncertainty about drug eﬀectiveness
generate supplier inducement and brand loyalty respectively.
In this traditional framework, physicians are the core of the system, how-
ever, under the new scenario of easier access to information, patients are be-
coming more demanding and even go as far as questioning their physicians’
prescription. Furthermore, new regulation also encourages patients to adopt
an active role in the decision between brand-name and generic drugs. In this
sense, healthcare systems are going through a transition from a physician-
directed system to a patient-directed one (Section 2).
The new pharmaceutical framework makes the analysis of patient pref-
erences interesting, however the empirical literature on pharmaceuticals de-
mand is very limited and has always been focused on the behavior of either
physicians or pharmacists. Furthermore, all these studies use revealed pref-
erence data to estimate the objective utility function. On the contrary, this
paper directly focuses on consumers’ preferences using stated preference data
(Section 3).
As far as we are aware, this paper is the ﬁrst to explore consumers’ pref-
erences for commercial drugs using stated preference data obtained from a
choice survey. This method is based on the premise that consumers evaluate
the convenience of a product by combining the separate amounts of utility
provided by each attribute. In our case, a representative sample of 439 indi-
viduals are surveyed and asked to rank a set of commercial drug alternatives
according to their preferences (Section 4).
The parameters of our utility function are estimated using a rank ordered
logit -a generalization of McFadden’s conditional logit- and will determine
the signiﬁcance of brand loyalty, laboratory reputation and reliance upon
healthcare experts throughout the decision-making process (Section 5).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The nature of phar-
maceutical demand and the role of consumer preferences is described in depth
in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the most recent methodologies used in the
estimation of consumer preferences. Section 4 describes the stages involved
in an experimental design from the identiﬁcation of attributes and levels to
3the collection of data. Section 5 summarizes the results and, ﬁnally, Section
6 brings together the conclusions.
2 The Nature of Pharmaceutical Demand
Demand for pharmaceutical drugs is unusual in the sense that the consumer
is typically not the one deciding which product to consume and often not
the one paying for it. Indeed, the purchase of pharmaceutical products is
more than a ”purchasing act in itself” because it involves a multistage pro-
cess: ﬁrstly, a physician writes a drug prescription, secondly, a pharmacist
dispenses and substitutes whenever possible (diagnosis and treatment)a n d ,
ﬁnally, a patient pays and consumes (drug consumption).1 Therefore, we can
not disconnect the drug purchase act from the visit to health experts.2 Fig-
ure 2.4 displays two diﬀerent levels of bilateral relationships: those between
experts -physicians and pharmacists- and patients and those between each
of the agents and the drugs.
1The role of the pharmacist at the dispensing stage is determined by the nature of
national substitution laws and the amount to be paid by the patient depends on the
pharmaceuticals reimbursement mechanism that applies to each country.
































Figure 2.4. Bilateral Relationships in the Pharmaceutical Market
The drug purchasing process is characterized by the existence of infor-
mation asymmetries between physicians and patients and uncertainty about
drug eﬀectiveness. Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the infor-
mation hold by the physician regarding the consequences and possibilities of
treatment is necessarily very much greater than that of the patient, or at
least, so it is believed by both parties. On the other hand, since most drugs
diﬀer both in their eﬀectiveness and their incidence of side eﬀects across pa-
tients, uncertainty is also an important and long-recognized component of
drug consumption (Arrow, 1963). Diagnosis and treatment services provided
by heath professionals fulﬁl the deﬁnition of credence service and generates
supplier inducement. On the other hand, drug consumption satisﬁes the
characteristics of an experience good and raises brand loyalty among con-
sumers.
2.1 Supplier Inducement
Credence goods have the characteristics that, even when consumers can ob-
serve the utility they derive from the product/service ex-post, they cannot
5judge whether the quality they received corresponds to their ex-ante require-
ments. Therefore, sellers act as experts determining customers’ needs. This
information asymmetry between buyer and seller obviously creates strong in-
centives for opportunistic seller behavior (Edmons, 1997). If this expert also
supplies the customer with the treatment then the ”expert fraudulent” prob-
lem can emerge, that is, the expert prescribes excessive use of the product
to the consumer. This is usually the case between health professionals and
patients. Under the new regulatory framework, pharmacists are allowed to
substitute a therapeutically equivalent drug for the one written on the physi-
cian’s prescription.3 Therefore, pharmacists play a new role in the treatment
process and also become experts. As consumers are aware of the expert fraud-
ulent problem, they face a psychological switching cost of changing from an
expert they believe they can rely on (Klemperer, 1995).4 As a consequence,
trust becomes a key element in the relationship between the consumer and
the expert. Patients ﬁrmly trust their doctors’ and pharmacists’ opinions
and are reluctant to switch to other treatment if experts do not advise them
to do so.
Two problems have been the focus of research in the literature on cre-
dence goods: (i) provision of an ineﬃcient treatment and (ii) charging for a
more expensive treatment than that provided. The ﬁrst problem can be of
two types: on the one hand, it is ineﬃcient if a consumer receives a cheap
treatment, when he actually needs an expensive one. This ineﬃciency is
labelled undertreatment. On the other hand, it is ineﬃcient if a consumer
receives an expensive treatment when a cheap one would be enough to solve
their problem. This ineﬃciency is labelled overtreatment. The second po-
tential problem is that an expert might claim to have supplied an expensive
treatment even if they have only provided a cheap one. This kind of fraud
is labelled overcharging (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2001). In Health Eco-
3Most of the American states have adopted ”permissive substitution laws” that allow
a pharmacist to substitute a therapeutically equivalent drug for the one written on the
prescription. In Europe, several countries have also approved mandatory substitution
laws. These countries are: Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Norway and Spain (NERA, 2001).
4Psychological switching costs appear when the use of a product can induce a person
to change their tastes so that they prefer a certain product to a functionally identical one.
Psychological switching costs can also arise when the good in question is a credence good,
that is, a product or service whose uselfulness or necessity is not directly measurable by
the consumer, even after consumption, and may only be known by the expert seller. One
example of credence goods is the medical services.
6nomics, the phenomenon of overtreatment is commonly known as supplier-
induced demand.5 Professional ethics encourages supplier inducement in the
interest of the patient, because the latter often has insuﬃcient information
to judge what treatment will improve their health.
2.2 Brand Loyalty
As previously mentioned, drug consumption shares the characteristics of ex-
perience goods. An experience good is a product whose quality or suitability
for the buyer is only discoverable after consumption. When the buyer knows
more about the quality of one good the longer he has consumed it, the option
to switch is not an attractive one because of the risk it involves. Consequently,
in order to switch, buyers may have to be compensated for this uncertainty.
As stated by Klemperer (1995), consumers tend to re-use those medicines
that have already worked for them, in preference to taking the gamble of
trying drugs that they have not tested before and that may not suit them.
In pharmaceutical markets, a consumer behaves as if they faced a switching
cost equal to the maximum premium that they would be willing to pay to
be guaranteed a product of the same value as the one they have previously
purchased.
As noted by Klemperer (1987), the existence of switching costs can mean
that ex-ante identical and homogeneous products become ex-post heteroge-
nous. Consequently, switching costs lead to a form of ”artiﬁcial” product
diﬀerentiation, which has implications for ﬁrms’ strategy and consumer be-
havior.
2.3 The New Role of Consumers Preferences
Several recent studies have stated that patients are becoming active partic-
ipants in the drug decision-making process, with the conﬁdence to question
and even override doctors’ decisions. This is mainly due to the fact that pa-
tients have greater access to information than before. Under these conditions,
healthcare systems are going through a transition from a physician-directed
system to a patient-directed one (Matthews, 2001). The drug decision-
m a k i n gp r o c e s sc o n s i s t so ft w os t a g e s :ﬁrst, the physician chooses the active
5Demand inducement exists when a healthcare provider, usually a physician, inﬂuences
a patient’s demand for care against his own interpretation of the best interest of the patient
(McGuire, 2000).
7ingredient and afterwards the commercial name -either a brand-name or a
generic version- is prescribed and dispensed. Although it would be rare that
patients inﬂuence the choice of the chemical compound, it is getting more
common for patients to participate in decisions on commercial products.
Evidence of this transition process is the recent phenomenon of the in-
creasing importance of Direct-To-Consumers Advertising (DTCA) in those
countries where legislation allows it. Advertising is a vehicle for getting infor-
mation to customers and telling them about product availability, quality and
cost. This spending on DTCA reﬂects a widespread belief within the phar-
maceutical industry that patients may inﬂuence the choice of prescription
drugs (Coscelli, 2000).
The wedge between the interests and preferences of the patient and the
actual behavior of the physician raises the concept of patient compliance or
non-compliance. After receiving a drug prescription from a physician, pa-
tients choose whether or not to ﬁll the prescription (purchase compliance),
whether or not to consume the drug in accordance with the doctor’s prescrip-
tion (use compliance) and whether or not to maintain the prescription over
the life of reﬁlls and follow-up (sustained compliance). Ellickson et al (1999)
reviewed evidence that non-compliance rates are astonishingly high, reaching
up to 70%, and found that there is substantial variation in the compliance
rate, depending on the type of drug and disease being treated.
Armantier and Namoro (2002) examined the prescription behavior of doc-
tors and compliance on the part of patients in an agency model that ac-
counts for the interplay between patient non-compliance, direct-to-consumer
advertising and drug promotion toward doctors. They found that doctors’
prescriptions are directly inﬂuenced by the probability of patients’ noncom-
pliance as well as by advertising aimed at doctors and patients.
Finally, another factor that stimulates the patient to become a decision-
maker at the chemist’s shop is the implementation of substitution laws. In
some sense, this legal framework encourages the use non-compliance,t h a ti s ,
although patients are not able to choose between active ingredients, they can
indeed decide between the generic or the branded version of the same drug.
In several European countries, governments have introduced the refer-
ence price system, a reimbursement mechanism aimed at motivating those
price-sensitive consumers to replace expensive brand-name drugs with their
corresponding lower-cost generic versions. The aim of the Health Ministries
is then to mitigate the habit persistence and brand loyalty of consumers
providing economic incentives through a cost reduction in the purchase of
8pharmaceutical drugs.
In conclusion, under the scenario of easier access to information, patients
become more demanding and may even reject their physicians’ prescription.
Furthermore, new regulation also encourages patients to adopt an active role
in the decision-making process between brand-name and generic drugs.
3 Estimation of Consumers Preferences
The aim of this paper is to estimate consumer preferences for commercial
drugs using a choice modeling experiment. As mentioned before, the new
pharmaceutical framework makes the analysis of patient preferences inter-
esting, however, the empirical literature on pharmaceuticals demand is very
limited and has always been focused on the behavior of either physicians or
pharmacists. Moreover, all of them use revealed preference data to estimate
the degree of supplier inducement in the drug purchasing process; that is,
these models use historical data on the choices eﬀectively made by physicians
or pharmacists.6
A sf a ra sw ea r ea w a r e ,t h i sp a p e ri st h eﬁrst to explore consumer prefer-
ences throughout the drug purchasing process using stated preference data
obtained from a choice survey.7 In this special type of surveys, customers are
asked to respond a list of socio-economic questions and rank, according to
their preferences, a series of alternatives that represent real or hypothetical
products. Although economists typically display sckepticism about relying
on what consumers say they will do compared with observing what they ac-
tually do, there are many situations in which one has little alternative but to
take consumers at their word. The premise of this article is that stated pref-
erence surveys can produce data consistent with economic theory, and from
this it is possible to estimate econometric models which are indistinguishable
from their revealed preference data counterparts.
6The empirical work by Ellison et al (1997) analyzed the prescription and dispensing
process and therefore the preferences of physicians and pharmacists. Using micro-data,
Hellerstein (1998) examined physicians’ prescription behavior and found evidence of per-
sistence , even after controlling for observable characteristics of physicians and patients.
Lundin (2001) found the existence of moral hazard in the physician prescription behav-
ior. Coscelli (2000) used a panel daa on both doctors and patients so as to analyze the
importance of their preferences in the prescription decision.
7By choice survey we mean any form of data collection involving the elicitation of
preferences.
9Traditionally, the majority of econometric models have used revealed pref-
erences (RP) to estimate consumers preferences, however, stated preference
(SP) data have been extensively used in market research and, more recently,
in discrete choice modeling techniques. In some cases, the use of SP has
important advantages: (i) SP allows the estimation of consumer preferences
in those situations where information on the choices made by individuals is
not available; (ii) in addition to this, it is possible to estimate the preferences
of individuals for attributes or characteristics of products that are currently
non-existent; (iii) SP solves the problem of collinearity that exist between
product characteristics when RP is used. This is probably the most com-
mon limitation of RP data and one might well wonder why many economists
would argue that severely ill-conditioned RP data are superior to SP data
just because they reﬂect ”true” market choices and (iv) SP allows the range
of possible values in product characteristics to be extended. In many cases,
RP is limited by the low variability of some product characteristics (such as
price) that prevent the parameters of the utility function from being esti-
mated eﬃciently.
In our case, all conditions are satisﬁed up to a certain extent. For exam-
ple, in Spain, there is not enough market information about the choice made
by patients at the chemist’s shop. Moreover, we include non-existent alter-
natives (i.e. generic drugs which are more expensive than branded products)
i nt h ee x p e r i m e n tt ob ea b l et oc a p t u r et h et r a d e - o ﬀ between attributes.
Despite some advantages, SP data are not always considered to be valid
for model estimation due to the uncertain reliability of information elicited
under hypothetical scenarios. SP data may contain biases and large random
errors if the decision making protocol exercised in a hypothetical situation
diﬀers from that exercised in a real choice context. Some of the diﬃculties
we may face are the following (Morikawa et al, 2002): (i) the respondent con-
siders only the most important attribute of the alternatives (the prominence
hypothesis); (ii) the response is inﬂuenced by an inertia of the current actual
choice; (iii) the respondent uses the questionnaire as an opinion statement
f o rh i so rh e ro w nb e n e ﬁt; (iv) the respondent does not consider situational
constraints and (v) the respondent misinterprets or ignores an attribute if
the attribute value lacks reality.
In order to avoid all these problems, it becomes crucial to design the ex-
periment perfectly. This implies correctly identifying the attributes and their
corresponding levels, constructing choice sets and alternatives, determining
dominance criteria and presenting a realistic scenario.
103.1 Choice Modeling Methodology
Discrete choice models have been extensively used to analyze consumer choice
behavior because they enable us to measure the inﬂuence of demand at-
tributes. This class of models is based on the random utility theory (RUT)
developed by Thurnstone in 1927; however, current theory and methods owe
most of their legacy to McFadden who extended Thurstone’s original theory
for comparisons of pairs of alternatives to multiple comparisons and choices.
RUT leads to families of probabilistic discrete choice models that describe
the behavior of individuals in response to changes in choice attributes and/or
factors that measure diﬀerences in individuals. Families of probabilistic dis-
crete choice models can be derived by specifying a particular probability
distribution for εij. McFadden postulated that the random components were
i.i.d.extreme value type I which leads to the multinomial or conditional logit
model.8
In this paper, we use a generalization of the well-known conditional logit
regression model introduced by McFadden (1973). In economics literature,
the generalization was proposed by Beggs et al (1981) and further devel-
oped by Hausman and Ruud (1987) under the name of rank-ordered logit
model. The model was independently formulated by marketing researchers
who called it the exploded logit model (Chapman and Staelin, 1982). They
developed a procedure to enhance the estimation of the parameters of the
stochastic utility model by exploiting the additional information contained
in the preference rank ordering of choice set alternatives.9
In a rank ordered logit model, each of the terms in the product has
the form of a conditional logit model. The ﬁrst step is to choose the most
preferred item from among the entire set of J items. McFadden’s model for






When that choice has been made, the probability that the respondent will
8Historically this distribution has been referred to by several names, including, Gumbel,
Weibull or double-exponential.
9Also called Contingent Ranking.






i.e. the term associated with j∗ is removed from the denominator. This
continues so that, at each step, the denominator is calculated by substracting
the numerator in the previous step from the denominator in the previous step.
If the ﬁnal choice is between items r and s, the probability of choosing r is:
exp(Xirβ)
exp(Xirβ)+e x p ( Xisβ)
(3)









where δik =1if Yik > Yij and 0 otherwise. Let Yij be the rank given to
alternative j by respondent i.I ft h e r ea r eJ alternatives in each choice set,
then Yij can take integer values from 1 through to J, where 1 is the ”best”
rank and J is the ”worst”.
In order to obtain eﬃcient estimators it is indispensable for the survey
to be designed in a way that minimizes the variance and co-variance ma-
trix of utility function parameter estimates. This requires the design of an
experiment from which attributes and their corresponding levels are identi-
ﬁed, factorial design and choice sets are constructed and a questionnaire is
written.
4 Experimental Design
Recently there has been an increasing interest in choice modeling experiments
applied to health economics for eliciting individuals’ preferences for non-
existing healthcare programs, relationships between doctor and patient and
willingness to pay for diﬀerent healthcare treatments.
In contrast to revealed preferences, stated preference data are generated
by some systematic and planned design processes in which attributes and
12levels are pre-deﬁned without measurement error and combined to permit
rigorous testing of certain hypotheses of interest. This systematic process is
called factorial design and consists of the factorial enumeration of all pos-
sible combinations of attribute levels, that is, each level of each attribute is
combined with every level of all other attributes thereby building diﬀerent
choice alternatives. Afterwards, each individual is presented with a sequence
of choice sets and asked to rank their most preferred alternatives. Each choice
set contains several alternatives deﬁned by a set of attributes and attribute
levels. Individuals’ preferences are revealed by their choices (Carlsson et al,
2002).
A natural and important question is how good the priors about the pa-
rameters in the utility function are. Some indicative information can be
obtained from reviewing literature and consulting experts, but running focus
groups and pilot studies is also of vital importance. As a preliminary step,
focus groups and pilot studies are used to collect information about suitable
attributes and attribute levels to include in the experiment. Furthermore,
they are often used to test the questionnaire and to give information about
how respondents receive and interpret the information presented. Further
sections describe in more detail the development of focus groups and pilot
test carried out throughout our experiment.
A description of the development of a choice modeling experiment, which
is applicable to all types of stated preference surveys is given by Ryan et al
(1997), Hanley et al (2001), Carlsson et al (2002) and all of them identiﬁed
the following stages: (i) selection of attributes and assignment of correspond-
ing levels, (ii) construction of the choice sets by combining the attribute levels
in each of the alternatives, (iii) collection of responses and (iv) econometric
analysis of data. The ﬁrst stage consists of identifying the relevant attributes
and their corresponding levels to be valued. This is usually done through
literature reviews, focus groups discussions and consulting experts. From
conclusions, the dependent variables of the utility function are selected. The
second stage, which is usually called statistical design, implies the choice of
a full factorial versus a fractional factorial design, the construction of choice
sets to be presented to the respondents and the choice of a survey proce-
dure to measure individual preferences (ratings, rankings and choices). The
collection of responses implies a ﬁeldwork in which a representative sample
of individuals is selected and asked to answer socio-economic questions and
ranked the alternatives in each of the choice sets. Finally, once dataset is
constructed, maximum likelihood estimation procedure is applied in order to
13obtain the results.
The present section analyzes the ﬁrst three stages of the experimental
design and additionally selects the active ingredients to which the choice
survey applies. The next section summarizes the results of the estimated
models including the eﬀects of each of the choice attributes (main eﬀects)
and demand segmentation according to socio-economic and habit purchase
characteristics (interactions).
4.1 Selection of Drugs
We developed two parallel experiments -one referring to a common infection
and the other to a chronic disease- with the aim of seeing whether the degree
of illness awareness could modify consumers’ decision between a brand-name
and a generic drug. So as to present a realistic scenario to individuals, we
identiﬁed two active ingredients that should fulﬁl some basic conditions.
The ﬁrst active ingredient we looked for had to be used for common infec-
tions, such as a throat infection, implying an occasional and non-continuous
treatment at individual level but a high level of consumption among the pop-
ulation at large. For the second experiment, we needed a drug for a chronic
disease implying a long and repeated treatment throughout the year. The
selected chronic disease had to be widely spread among population, though
it could not be subject to ”price reduction”.10
For the ﬁrst experiment, we selected a throat infection and an antibiotic
to treat it.11 The use of an antibiotic could not be repeated and continuous
throughout the year and a throat infection is only supposed to be caught
occasionally. From the conclusions derived from the focus group discussions
and the statistics on consumption of active ingredients, we realized that
amoxiciline could be a potential candidate. According to the National Health
System (SNS) statistics, although amoxiciline has recently dropped positions
in the rankings of the most consumed compounds, it is still one of the most
relevant by number of packages, together with paracetamol and acetylsalicylic
acid (Table 2.7).12
10According to Royal Decree 83/1993, patients aﬀected by one of the chronic disease
contemplated in the mentioned Royal Decree must just pay a 10% of the total price.
11A recent study published at JAMA (2001) found that the great majority of patients
that visit the doctor because of a throat infection receives an antibiotic treatment, although
this therapy is only appropriate for the 10% of cases (Correo Farmacéutico, 17/09/2001).
12Spanish Ministry of Health. Statistics available at www.pmfarma.com
14Packages Ranking Packages Ranking Packages Ranking Packages Ranking Packages Ranking
Paracetamol 17,106 1 18,067 1 20,170 1 23,960 1 25,349 1
Annual growth rate 5.6% 11.6% 18.8% 5.8%
Amoxiciline 11,434 2 10,722 2 10,320 3 10,433 3 9,187 5
Annual growth rate -6.2% -3.7% 1.1% -11.9%
Acetylsalicylic Acid 7,928 6 8,835 6 9,821 2 10,833 2 11,467 2
Annual growth rate 11.4% 11.2% 10.3% 5.9%
Source: Spanish Ministry of Health. Statistics available at www.pmfarma.com.
2000 Consumption in 
volume (# packages) 
1996 1997 1998 1999
Table 2.7. Ranking of Most Consumed Compounds (# packages)
There are several amoxiciline homogeneous groups, each of them diﬀering
according to dosage, package and form (i.e. amoxiciline 500 mg 24 capsules,
amoxiciline 1 g 12 capsules). In each homogeneous group, there are several
brand-name drugs (Clamoxyl, Ardine, Amoxi Gobens, Agerpen, Amoxibac-
ter) and, at least, one generic version identiﬁe db yt h en a m eo ft h el a b o r a t o r y
(Cinfa, Benox, Esteve, Ratiopharm, Mundogen, Geminis, Normon).13
For the second experiment, after an in-depth analysis of various chronic
diseases (e.g. hypertension, diabetes, psoriasis), we ﬁnally selected high blood
cholesterol because it is a widely spread cardiovascular risk factor and choles-
terol lowering therapies are not subject to ”price reduction”. In Spain, some
chronic therapies are subject to ”price reduction”, that is, Social Security
(third-party) partly ﬁnances the cost of treatment and patients only pay a
10% copayment. In these cases, individuals are less sensitive to price.
The prevalence of hypercholesterolemia among the Spanish population is
quite high. In the 35 to 64 year old age category, 18% of the population
have high blood cholesterol equal or superior to 250 mg/dl and 57.8% have
a level equal or superior to 200 mg/dl. Elevated Low Density Lipoprotein
(LDL) is a major cause of coronary heart disease (CHD). In Spain, cardio-
vascular diseases rank as the ﬁrst cause of death and their demographic,
health and social impact is increasing (Plaza Perez et al, 2000). Although
high blood cholesterol is considered a severe risk factor, drug therapy is not
always recommended. Everyone with elevated LDL cholesterol is treated
with therapeutic life-style changes and drug therapy is reserved for those at
relatively high risk. Major risk factors are: cigarette smoking, hypertension,
13Brand-name drugs have commercial names while generic drugs are labeled with the
name of the laboratory.
15low levels of High Density Lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, family history of
premature coronary heart disease and diabetes.14
Statins -HMG CoA reductase inhibitors- are ﬁrst line drugs for the treat-
ment of high blood cholesterol. In cases of moderate-severe hypertriglyc-
eridemia or low HDL-cholesterol, ﬁbrates are preferred.15 Statins are the
most eﬀective and practical class of drugs for reducing LDL cholesterol con-
centrations. Other agents (bile acid sequestrants, nicotinic acid and some
ﬁbrates) can also moderately lower LDL levels. Table 2.8. shows the most
consumed statins in the Spanish National Health System. Atorvastatin has
recently entered the market and obtained a high degree of penetration.
Consumption in value 
(thousand €)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Simvastatin 65,795 77,826 90,811 102,381
Atorvastatin 2,459 64,733 99,394 121,946
Pravastatin 46,236 49,661 58,928 72,752
Lovastatin 45,547 42,686 n.a. n.a.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Health. Statistics available at www.pmfarma.com.
Table 2.8. Ranking of Statins Consumption
Both lovastatin and simvastatin are in the reference price system, that is,
the patent on the corresponding brand-name drugs has already expired and
generic versions are available in the pharmaceutical market. There are sev-
eral lovastatin and simvastatin homogeneous groups, each of them diﬀering
according to dosage, package and form. In each homogeneous group, there
are several brand-name drugs (Zocor, Pantok, Nergadan, Mevacor) and, at
least, one generic version (Cinfa, Benox, Esteve, Ratiopharm, Mundogen,
Geminis, Normon).
14Risk assessment for determining the 10-year risk for developing coronary heart disease
is carried out using Framingham risk scores. The risk factors included in the Framingham
calculation of 10-year risk are: age, total cholesterol, HDL cholesterol, systolic blood
pressure, treatment for hypertension and cigarette smoking.
15Examples of statins: lovastatin, simvastatin, pravastatin, ﬂuvastatin, atorvastatin,
cerivastatin. Examples of ﬁbrates: gemﬁbrozil, fenoﬁbrate and cloﬁbrate.
164.2 Attributes and Levels
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that individuals choose the product
that provides a greater level of satisfaction. The ﬁnal decision depends fun-
damentally on the following factors: (i) product characteristics, (ii) product
price, (iii) socio-demograhic characteristics of the consumer (i.e. age, gen-
der, education, income) and (iv) use of the product made by the consumer
in the past. Choice modeling estimates the importance of these factors in
the decision taken by the consumer.
Therefore, the ﬁrst stage of a choice design consists of identifying the
relevant attributes -and their corresponding levels- of the good to be valued.
Monetary cost is typically one of the factors to be included because it allows
for the estimation of willingness-to-pay (WTP). The rest of attributes and
their levels of variation are identiﬁed through reviewing the relevant litera-
ture, focus groups discussions and consulting experts. The attribute levels
should be feasible, realistic and non-linearly spaced, and they should span
the range of respondents’ preference maps. Kanninen (2002) shows that, in
an optimal design, each attribute should only have two levels, even in the
case of a multinomial choice experiment and the levels should be set at two
extreme points of the distribution of the parameters.
From reviewing the relevant literature, we identiﬁed ap r i o r ias e to ff a c -
tors that may inﬂuence the consumers’ decision between commercial drugs:
supplier inducement and brand loyalty. We also conducted two focus groups
discussions aimed at collecting participants’ opinions and perceptions about
the consumption of drugs and the entry of generic versions into the pharma-
ceutical market (Appendix A).
We ﬁnally identiﬁed the following ﬁve attributes which are classiﬁed in
three diﬀerent clusters: (i) price elasticity: the whole price of the drug, that
is, the price level is supposed to be the total amount paid by consumers (there
is no reimbursement mechanism); (ii) brand loyalty: we include ”com-
mercial name” -either a brand-name drug (incumbent) or a generic version-
and ”laboratory reputation”, whether a producer is well-known or unknown
and (iii) supplier inducement: we include ”physician’s prescription” and
”pharmacist’s recommendation”.
Table 2.9 shows drugs attributes and levels. The process by which each
level of each attribute is combined with every level of all other attributes
generates the diﬀerent alternatives to be valued by individuals.
17Attibute Levels for Amoxiciline Levels for Statins
Commercial name Clamoxyl (brand-name) Brand-name
Ardine (brand-name)
Generic Generic
Laboratory reputation Known Known
Unknown Unknown
Price 1 € 6 €
4 € 16 €
20 € 40 €
Physician prescription Prescribed Prescribed
Not prescribed Not prescribed
Pharmacist recommendation Recommended Recommended
Not recommended Not recommended
Table 2.9. Attributes and Levels
In both experiments, we include the same attributes, though the levels
m a yv a r ya c c o r d i n gt ot h es p e c i ﬁca c t i v ei n g r e d i e n t .H o w e v e r ,t h el e v e l sf o r
”Laboratory reputation”, ”Physician prescription” and ”Pharmacist recom-
mendation” are exactly equal for both the amoxiciline and statins experi-
ments. ”Laboratory reputation” takes two levels -known and unknown- and
detects the reliance of patients on the drug producer. Instead of making a list
using real names of laboratories, we classify them according to popularity.
Train et al (2000) uses the same concept in an experiment about electricity
suppliers.
”Physician prescription” takes two levels, either it is a commercial brand
directly prescribed by the physician or it is not. Although we assume that
the physician always prescribes the active ingredient -amoxiciline or statins-,
in some cases, they prescribe the brand-name drug and in others the generic
version (Hellerstein, 1998). ”Pharmacist recommendation” also takes two
levels, either the commercial brand is recommended by the pharmacist or
it is not. The advice of the pharmacist may or may not coincide with the
physician’s prescription. We introduce the role of the pharmacist because,
due to substitution laws, they can actively participate in the prescription and
dispensing process.
”Commercial name” and ”Price” levels vary according to each active in-
gredient.
For the amoxiciline experiment, we took the homogeneous group of Amox-
iciline 500 mg 24 capsules as the reference, one of the most standard in terms
of dosage, package and form. In this case, commercial name can take three
18diﬀerent values, two equivalent specialities (EQ) -Clamoxyl and Ardine- and
the corresponding generic version (EFG).16 Clamoxyl and Ardine are incum-
bent brand-name drugs in the pharmaceutical market and both well-known
by population. ”Price” ranges from the extreme values of 1 euro to 20 eu-
ros, with the average price of 4 euros being equal to the reference price for
Amoxicline 500 mg 24 capsules.17
In the case of statins, the benchmark is the homogeneous group of Lovas-
t a t i n2 0m g2 8c a p s u l e s .” C o m m e r c i a ln a m e ”t a k e so n l yt w ov a l u e s ,e i t h e r
a brand-name drug or a generic version. Although lovastatin is the refer-
ence active ingredient, we considered an extensive list of brand-name drugs,
which included Zocor, Cardyl, Mevacor, Taucor, etc. ”Prices” ranges from
the extreme values of 6 euros to 40 euros, with the average price of 16 euros
being the reference price for Lovastatin 20 mg 28 capsules.
4.3 Statistical Design
Statistical design theory consists of combining the levels of the attributes into
a number of alternative scenarios or proﬁles to be presented to respondents.
In the amoxiciline experiment, we have three attributes with two levels of
variation and two attributes with three levels of variations which implies a
total of 72 (23∗32) scenarios. For the statins, we have four attributes with two
levels of variation and one attribute, price, with three levels which implies a
total of 48 (24 ∗3) possible alternatives. Such a complete enumeration of all
possible combinations is often called ”complete factorial” or ”full factorial”.
From the point of view of maximizing the amount of information, it would
be desirable if all individuals could rank all possible attribute levels combi-
nations according to their preferences, in our case, 72 and 48 combinations
respectively. However, this would be too cognitively demanding as well as
time consuming, so the complexity of the choice experiment thus needs to
be reduced. One way is to let the individuals compare a small number of
alternatives in a choice set. Fractional factorial designs are able to reduce
the number of scenario combinations presented with a concomitant loss of
estimating power. The proﬁles identiﬁed by the experimental design are then
grouped into choice sets to be presented to respondents (Hanley et al, 2001).
16EQ: Especialidad Equivalente. EFG: Especialidad Farmacéutica Genérica.
17The reference price for Amoxiciline 500 mg 24 capsules is established by the Spanish
Ministry of Health.
19The central question is then how to combine the alternatives from the full
factorial design into the choice sets (fractional factorial) so that a maximum
amount of information is extracted given other constraints such as the num-
ber of choice sets in the experiment. In particular, the main objective is to
estimate all coeﬃcients with high precision in order to calculate an accurate
value for each attribute, that is, to minimize the error around the estimated
parameters β:
Uij = Xijβ + εij (5)
McFadden (1973) shows that the distribution of
∧
β is asymptotically normal





Thus, the problem of optimal design can be seen as a problem of deﬁning
the design matrix X, in such a way that the size of the covariance matrix of
the estimator β is minimized. The goodness or eﬃciency of an experimental
design can be quantiﬁed. Common measures of design eﬃciency are based on
the information matrix X0X. The variance-covariance matrix of the vector
of parameter estimates β is proportional to (X0X)−1.A n e ﬃcient design
will have a small variance matrix and the eigenvalues of (X0X)−1 provide
measures of its size. The most prominent eﬃciency measures are based on
the idea of quantifying size by averaging (in some sense) the eigenvalues or
variances. Some examples of eﬃciency measures are A-eﬃciency, D-eﬃciency
and G-eﬃciency, however, the most common is D-eﬃciency because it is less
computationally burdensome:18









where k is the number of parameters to estimate. The aim is to maximize
D-eﬃciency and minimize the error measure inversely related to it (Huber
and Zwerina, 1996):







Huber and Zwerina (1996) identify four properties that characterize eﬃcient
choice designs: (i) level balance, (ii) orthogonality, (iii) minimal overlap and
18A-eﬃciency is a function of the arithmetic mean of the eigenvalues. D-eﬃciency is
af u n c t i o no ft h eg e o m e t r i cm e a no ft h ee i g e n v a l u e sa n dG - e ﬃciency is based on the
maximum standard error for prediction over the candidate set. All three of these criteria
are convex functions of the eigenvalues of (X0X)−1 and hence are usually highly correlated.
20(iv) utility balance. A design that satisﬁes these principles has a maximum
D-eﬃciency (and therefore a minimum D-error). Two of these, level bal-
ance and orthogonality, also characterize linear designs. The third, minimal
overlap, becomes relevant for choice designs, because each attribute level is
only meaningful in comparison to others within a choice set. Utility balance
requires that the utility of each alternative in a choice set is equal.19
Kuhfeld et al (1994) use a computerized search algorithm to minimize
D-eﬃciency in order to construct an eﬃcient, but not necessarily orthogonal
linear design. A modiﬁed Federov algorithm works in the following way: an
initial design is randomly drawn from a full factorial design. From the initial
design the algorithm will, through an iterative process, exchange alternatives
in the initial design with ones from a list of candidate alternatives until it is
not possible to reduce D-error any further. Experts have worked with SAS
language in order to obtain, as ﬁnal output, a design matrix of alternatives
determined by the number of choice sets and the number of alternatives in
each choice set taking into account orthogonality criteria.20 It is also common
to add a non-purchase alternative (blank card) to the choice set; that is, the
option to choose none of the rest of the alternatives (”nothing is important”).
Finally, it is important to present attribute levels in a choice set so that
none of the attributes become dominant or inferior. Traditional designs, such
as orthogonal designs, disregard this aspect and only ensure that we can es-
timate the eﬀects of the diﬀerent attributes independently of each other. A
D-optimal design explicitly considers the importance of the levels of the at-
tributes and ensures that the alternatives in the choice sets provide more
information about the trade-oﬀ between the diﬀerent attributes. However,
this requires explicit incorporation of prior information about the respon-
dents’ preferences into the design. Thus, a key issue when applying more
advanced designs is the need for more prior information. One source of in-
formation is the results from previous studies, but primarily the information
19Orthogonality is satisﬁed when the levels of each attribute vary independently of
one another. Level balance is satisﬁed when the levels of each attribute appear with
equal frequency. Minimal overlap is satisﬁed when the alternatives in each choice set have
nonoverlapping attribute levels. Utility balance is satisﬁed when the utilities of alternatives
within choice sets are the same (Huber and Zwerina, 1996).
20There are two modules in SAS for experimental designs. QC is devoted to experimental
designs and module IML of matricial language. There are several macros such as MKTDES
and CHOICEFF. The latter is more appropiate for a choice model experiment because it
takes into account a multinomial logit model.
21is obtained from own focus groups and pilot studies (Carlsson et al, 2002).
4.3.1 Our Experiment
We carried out two diﬀerent choice designs, one for amoxiciline and the other
for statins. Due to the elevated number of combinations, a fractional factorial
design seems to be the best solution, thus implying the construction of several
choice sets each composed of a limited number of alternatives. As stated
before, one of the alternatives in each choice set must be the blank card or
the non-purchase option.
We assumed the blank card for the throat infection to be ”Home reme-
dies”, a natural alternative to treat an infection without taking antibiotics
and the blank card for high blood cholesterol to be ”Soya lecitine”, a natural
medicine used to reduce and maintain LDL cholesterol. Taking into account
the potential number of respondents, we ﬁnally construct 50 choice sets, each
composed of 5 alternatives, one of them being the blank card. Besides this,
we also carried out two diﬀerent choice experiments for each active ingredi-
ent, with each experiment diﬀering in the utility function form: in the ﬁrst
case, we assumed a linear utility function with logarithmic price and in the
second one, a linear utility function with quadratic price. In both scenarios,
the design matrix was exactly the same.
Once the design matrix had been obtained, we had to analyze the exis-
tence of dominant or inferior alternatives in each choice set. The idea behind
this is to eliminate those alternatives in a choice set that are dominant be-
cause otherwise there could be a loss of information in the trade-oﬀ.I nf a c t ,
we want utility balance criteria to be satisﬁed and therefore we need prior
information about consumers preferences in the pharmaceuticals market. Be-
low, we present the main assumptions about dominance:
• Those drugs (alternatives) in a choice set that are neither prescribed by
the physician nor recommended by pharmacist are considered as ”bad”
if the rest of the attributes levels (commercial name, laboratory and
price) are equal.
• The alternative formed by levels ”generic”, ”unknown laboratory”,
”maximum price”, ”non prescribed” and ”non recommended” is also
a ”bad”, that is, assuming individual rationality, no respondent would
choose it. In this sense it is a dominated alternative, implying that the
rest of the alternatives in the same choice set are always superior.
22• The attributes combination composed of ”brand-name drug” (in the
case of amoxiciline, Clamoxyl), ”known laboratory”, ”minimum price”,
”prescribed” and ”recommended” can be considered a ”good”, that is,
it is the best combination and therefore, assuming individual ratio-
nality, will always dominate the rest of the alternatives whatever the
choice set.
• If some alternatives have the same levels of ”commercial name”, ”lab-
oratory” and ”price”, then we have to look at the ”physician prescrip-
tion” and ”pharmacist recommendation” attributes. Therefore, the
order of preferences will be: (1) prescribed and recommended, (2) pre-
scribed and non-recommended, (3) non-prescribed but recommended
and (4) non-prescribed and non-recommended. The same applies if the
price is low and the drug is highly prescribed and recommended.
The application of these dominance criteria aims to avoid the lexico-
graphic preference orderings where only one attribute matters and individuals
do not trade. In the case of a lexicographic ordering of goods and characteris-
tics, an individual is not prepared to trade-oﬀ and so goods or characteristics
cannot be substituted for one another (non-compensatory decision making).
In the case of a lexicographic ordering of a bundle of goods, there are no
other bundles to which it is indiﬀerent (Scott, 2002).
Finally, we imposed some additional conditions for the construction of
choice sets: (i) at least one drug (alternative) must be a generic version,
(ii) at least one drug (alternative) must be prescribed by the physician and
(iii) at least one drug (alternative) must be recommended by the pharmacist
(Appendix B).
4.4 Collection of Data
The experiment was conducted by the author with the help of students.21
It was essential to ensure that respondents understood the context, were
motivated to cooperate and able to participate in an informed manner. The
c o n t e x th a dt ob ea sr e a l i s t i ca sp o s s i b l ei no r d e rt oe n c o u r a g er e l i a b l ea n d
truthful responses (but not to bias the answers).
21We selected students from Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona and Carlos III
University in Madrid.
23The interview consisted of two parts: ﬁrstly individuals were asked about
socio demographic characteristics such as age, gender, educational level, pro-
fessional status, income and other factors (see questions 1-9) and habits of
drug purchase (see questions 10-24 in the amoxiciline questionnaire and ques-
tions 10-28 in the cholesterol questionnaire) and afterwards they were asked
to rank a set of alternatives according to their preferences for generic or
brand-name drugs taking into account diﬀerent combinations of attributes.
They were all close-ended questions with few levels of variation. At the end,
respondents were asked about their name and address (Appendix C). This
information about respondents will serve as control variables and will also
allow for the segmentation of demand according to socio-economic charac-
teristics and drug purchase habits.
In order to rank alternatives, a realistic scenario must be deﬁned. For the
amoxiciline experiment, respondents had to imagine a situation in which they
have a throat infection and, consequently, go to the primary care doctor. In
this case, the physician prescribes an antibiotic - amoxiciline- and afterwards
the patient has the option of throwing the prescription away and preparing
a natural remedy at home (blank card) or the option of buying a chemical
drug (the rest of the alternatives in the choice set).22 Each alternative in
the choice set represents a drug that can be either a generic or a trade-name
drug, prescribed or not prescribed, recommended or not recommended, etc.
For the statins experiment, respondents had to imagine a situation in which
the physician diagnoses high blood cholesterol and consequently prescribes
one type of statins. The patient has the option of taking a natural medicine
(blank card) or the option of buying one of the chemical drugs represented
in the choice set.
In order to carry out both experiments -amoxiciline and statins-, we have
to select two diﬀerent subsamples, one formed by the general population and
the other by people with high blood cholesterol. However, both subsamples
are asked to rank the alternatives for amoxiciline and statins.The interviews
took place in primary healthcare centers, chemist’s shops, hospitals or other
indoor and outdoor locations mainly in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona
(Spain).
22Under this scenario, patient noncompliance could appear.
244.4.1 Summary Statistics
The study recruited a total sample of 439 adults from 20 to 65 years old. Of
these, 315 belong to general population and 124 have high blood cholesterol;
the latter were mainly found in hospitals and primary healthcare centers.
According to a review of choice modeling experiments, the ratio between the
number of individuals surveyed (439) and the number of attributes estimated
(5 plus blank card) moves around the average (Table 2.10).
Title of the paper Journal # individuals # attributes Estimation method
"Predicting Consumer Preferences for Fresh Salmon: the 
Influence of Safety Inspection and Production Method 
Attributes" (Holland and Wessels)
Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Review (1998)
756 (mail survey)
3 attributes (main effects 
and interaction effects)
Rank ordered logit
"Measuring willingness-to-pay for risk reduction: an 




4 attributes (main effects) Random effects probit
"Using conjoint analysis to assess women's preferences for 
miscarriage management" (Ryan and Hughes)
Health Economics (1997) 196 (mail survey) 5 attributes Simple probit model
"Choice Modelling Approaches:a superior alternative for 
environmental valuation?" (Hanley et al)
Journal of Economic Surveys 
(2001)
267 (mail survey) 8 attributes Conditional logit model
"An application of a Product Positioning Model to 
Pharmaceutical Products" (Green and Krieger)
Marketing Science 356 (mail survey) 9 attributes Conjoint analysis
"Assessing the Potential Demand for Electric Cars" (Beggs et al) Journal of Econometrics (1981) 200 (survey) 9 attributes Rank ordered logit
"Conjoint Analysis of Price Premiums for Hotel Amenities" 
(Goldberg et al)
Journal of Business (1984)
180 (face-to-face 
interviews)
43 attributes Conjoint analysis
"Residential Broadbrand Subscription Demand: an Econometric 





13 attributes Conditional logit model
"Cellular Telephones in the Israeli Market: the Demand, the 




16 attributes Conditional logit model
"Customers' Choice Among Retail Energy Suppliers: the 




40 attributes Rank ordered logit
Table 2.10. Review of Choice Modelling Experiments
The general population subsample is representative of the Spanish pop-
ulation with respect to gender and age. According to statistics, the Spanish
population from 20 to 65 years old is formed by a 50% male and a 50% female
component. These percentages with respect to age are: 38% people from 20-
34 years old, 26% from 35-44, 22% from 45-54 and 11% from 55-65 years
25old.23 This slightly diﬀers from the structure of our subsample (Table 2.11).
We have a higher proportion of women due to the fact that they are usually
the one in charge of going to the chemist’s shop and buying the drugs.
We do not have much information about details of the prevalence of
cholesterol among the Spanish population, however we know that high blood
cholesterol aﬀe c t so l d e ra n dm a l ep e o p l em o r et h a ny o u n g e ra n df e m a l eo n e s .
This trend is also reﬂected in our sample.
23Source: National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE),
www.ine.es.
26Var i abl e name
Full sam ple 
(n=439)







Sex 439 315 124
M ale 41% 37% 52%
Female 59% 63% 48%
Age 436 313 123
20-34 31% 42% 5%
35-44 23% 26% 14%
45-54 27% 21% 40%
55-65 19% 11% 41%
Level of Education 438 315 123
None 3% 1% 6%
Prim ary 26% 21% 40%
Secondary 22% 20% 27%
University 49% 57% 28%
Professional Status 439 315 124
By his/her own 24% 25% 20%
Employed 48% 50% 40%
Unem ployed 8% 8% 6%
Housewife 16% 12% 27%
Ot her s* 5% 4% 6%
Fam ily H ead 438 315 123
Yes 45% 43% 50%
No 55% 57% 50%
C hildren 439 315 124
Yes 62% 55% 80%
No 38% 45% 20%
Hous e hol d Ne t  I nc ome 407 289 118
< 3000 €/m onth 79% 76% 86%
> 3000 €/m onth 21% 24% 14%
Private Insurance 439 315 124
Yes 32% 34% 26%
No 68% 66% 74%
Household Drug Expenditure 435 311 124
< 30 €/month 85% 90% 72%
> 30 €/month 15% 10% 28%
Laboratory Identification 438 315 123
Yes 32% 33% 31%
No 68% 67% 69%
Chem ist's Loyalty 437 314 123
Yes 68% 64% 79%
No 32% 36% 21%
Generic Knowledge 439 315 124
Yes 86% 88% 81%
No 14% 12% 19%
Generic Purchase 439 315 124
Yes 46% 46% 44%
No 54% 54% 56%
Region of Residence 438 315 123
Catalonia 84% 87% 76%
Rest of Spain 16% 13% 24%
Interview  Location 439 315 121
Prim ary health care center 14% 12% 21%
Hospital 13% 2% 37%
Chem ist's shop 11% 13% 5%
Others** 62% 73% 37%
* Others include students,  retired and disabled individuals.  
** Others include inw ard and outw ard locations, for exam ple, the airport, a gym , a 
restaurant or bar and a park or the street respectively.
H ealth Care H abits
Gener i c  Dr ugs
Sum mary Statistics for Explanatory Variables
Socio-econom ic C haracteristics
Table 2.11. Summary Statistics
27Other relevant socio-economic characteristics of our sample are: 1) 49%
of the total sample have university studies, 2) 48% of them are employed,
3) although the data are missing in 7% of cases, nearly 80% of the respon-
dents declared that they earned a net household income inferior to 3.000
euros/month.
Nearly 70% of respondents do not have private insurance and just 15% de-
clared that they spend more than 30 euros per month on drugs and medicines.
32% state that they take into account the name of the laboratory when buy-
ing a drug while 68% declare that they always buy drugs in the same chemist’s
shop. 86% of the respondents state that they are aware of the existence of
generic drugs and, from the full sample, only 46% declare that they have
once bought a generic drug.
5R e s u l t s
As explained before, the attributes that inﬂuence the drug purchase decision
are: (i) price, (ii) commercial name, (iii) laboratory reputation, (iv) physician
prescription and (v) pharmacist recommendation. The price parameter will
give an idea about elasticity and will also allow us to calculate willingness to
pay (WTP). The attributes ”commercial name” and ”laboratory reputation”
are both associated to brand loyalty while ”physician prescription” and
”pharmacist recommendation” are measures of supplier inducement.W e
also include the blank card or outside option in order to get consistency






• BRAND is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”commercial name” takes
the level GENERIC and 0 otherwise.
• LAB is also a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”laboratory reputation”
takes the level UNKNOWN and 0 otherwise.
• PRICE is a continuous variable that takes three diﬀerent values for
each experiment.
28• PHYSICIAN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”physician prescrip-
tion” takes the level YES and 0 otherwise
• PHARMA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”pharmacist recom-
mendation” takes the level YES and 0 otherwise.
• BLANK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the alternative is the blank
card (home remedies or soya lecitine) and 0 if the alternative is a chem-
ical drug.
As shown in Table 2.9, the variable BRAND diﬀe r sa c r o s se x p e r i m e n t s .
In the case of amoxiciline, ”commercial name” takes three diﬀerent levels
-Clamoxyl, Ardine and Generic- and therefore it must be decomposed in the





• GENERIC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”commercial name”
takes the level GENERIC and 0 otherwise.
• ARDINE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ”commercial name”
takes the level ARDINE and 0 otherwise.
We drop Clamoxyl because it is the most prevalent level and, therefore,
both variables are measured with respect to it.
The estimated coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the marginal utility de-
rived from each attribute. In the case of PRICE, marginal utility can be easily
interpreted. For those dummy variables 0-1, marginal utilities are interpreted
as the diﬀerence in utility from 0 to 1. For example, the LAB coeﬃcient rep-
resents the disutility of purchasing a drug produced by an unkown laboratory
with respect to a well-known one. Once the parameter estimates have been
obtained, a WTP compensating variation welfare measure that conforms to
demand theory can be derived for each attribute using the formula below if






24WTP = Market price + consumer’s surplus
29where A is equal to any non-price estimated coeﬃcient and γ is the price
parameter. .
Socio-economic variables can be included along with choice set attributes,
but since they are constant across choice occasions for any given individual
(for example, sex and age is the same for each choice they make), they can
only be entered as interaction terms. This is the reason why we ﬁrstly present
the main eﬀects estimated models -both for amoxiciline and statins- and
afterwards, we present the demand clustering exercise,i nw h i c hw ec a l c u l a t e
the main eﬀects model for those segments that have diﬀerent behavior with
respect to drug purchasing. We identify demand clusters according to socio-
demographic variables and drug purchase habits.
5.1 ”Main Eﬀects” Model
We used the rank-ordered or exploded logit to estimate utility function. As
stated before, the rank-ordered logit is a generalization of McFadden’s con-
ditional logit since each of the terms in the probability product has the form
of a conditional logit. In our experiment, each respondent had to fully rank
as e to fﬁve alternatives. First, we asked them to choose the most-preferred
one; then, to choose the most preferred card among the rest of alternatives
and so on.25
We also undertook several likelihood ratio (LR) tests in order to identify
the best model speciﬁcation. We contrasted the unrestricted model with
linear and quadratic (logarithm) price with the restricted one with linear
price and, according to the results, we can accept the restricted model in all
cases (χ2(1) < 3.84). There is no doubt about the speciﬁcation of the rest of
the attributes.
Table 2.12 displays the results of the ”main eﬀects” model for the amox-
iciline experiment. All parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Note
also that all of them have the expected signs. In particular, the GENERIC
and ARDINE parameters are both negative, which indicates a noteworthy
loyalty to Clamoxyl among the population. Remember that Clamoxyl is the
incumbent and most popular brand. The LAB parameter is negative, as
25We estimate the rank-ordered logit model using the command elogit (exploded logit)
from STATA.However, we also estimate each of the main eﬀects models using a gener-
alization of the clogit (conditional logit) command of STATA. That is, we replicate the
results of the elogit with an extensive form of clogit, taking into account four orderings
and four diﬀerent choice sets. elogit is an ADO ﬁle proposed by Jeroen Weesie.
30expected, which implies preference for a well-known laboratory producer in-
stead of an unknown one. The PRICE parameter is very small, this being
evidence of low price elasticity. The two parameters associated with supplier
inducement exert a strong inﬂuence on the drug purchasing process. PHYSI-
CIAN prescription is the most dominant factor in the decision between com-
mercial drugs and PHARMA is also a powerful attribute. This pattern is
also reﬂected in the WTP values; individuals would have to be paid more
than 9 euros in order to switch from Clamoxyl to the corresponding generic
version and more than 6 euros to switch from Clamoxyl to Ardine. On the
other hand, they are prepared to pay more than 24 euros for a favourable
physician prescription and more than 7 euros for a favourable pharmacist
recommendation.
Variable Coef. Std. Error P>|z| WTP
GENERIC -0.37** 0.07 0.00 9.63
ARDINE -0.25** 0.09 0.01 6.63
LAB -0.10* 0.06 0.08 2.73
PRICE -0.04** 0.00 0.00 1.00
PHYSICIAN 0.95** 0.07 0.00 -24.65
PHARMA 0.29** 0.06 0.00 -7.50
BLANK -1.45** 0.11 0.00 37.67
Number of Observations  6118
Log likelihood -1778.11
Pseudo R2 0.1501
** significant at 1%
* significant at 10%
Table 2.12. Amoxiciline Main Eﬀects Model (full sample)
Table 2.13 displays the results of the ”main eﬀects” model for the statins
experiment. In this case, all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
except for the parameter associated with the commercial name, GENERIC.
This is an expected result considering the fact that we use the full sample to
estimate the coeﬃcients. The full sample is composed of 70% general popu-
lation and 30% people with high blood cholesterol. The general population
can not recognize any brand-name drug for cholesterol and we also realize
that people with high blood cholesterol often forget the commercial name of
the capsules they take every day. Therefore, it is not rare to get a nul value
for brand loyalty. One point worth mentioning is the fact that the LAB pa-
rameter is more statistically signiﬁcant than in the amoxiciline experiment.
31One possible explanation is that when individuals can not recognize the com-
mercial brand they give more importance to the producer. Therefore, there
also exists a kind of brand loyalty. As expected, the signs for PHYSICIAN
and PHARMA are positive; however if we compare these parameters with
the ones obtained in the amoxiciline experiment, we realize that when peo-
ple are asked about a chronic disease they value physician prescription and
pharmacist recommendation even more. In this case, they are willing to pay
substantially more for experts advice.
Variable Coef. Std. Error P>|z| WTP
GENERIC 0.01 0.06 0.84 n.a.
LAB -0.19* 0.06 0.00 5.97
PRICE -0.03* 0.00 0.00 1.00
PHYSICIAN 1.35* 0.07 0.00 -43.28
PHARMACIST 0.44* 0.06 0.00 -14.06
BLANK -1.23* 0.11 0.00 39.46
Number of Observations  6118
Log Likelihood -1711.54
Pseudo R2 0.1819
* significant at 1%
Table 2.13. Statins Main Eﬀects Model (full sample)
We are now in position to give an idea about the importance of supplier
inducement and brand loyalty in the drug purchasing process. We ﬁnd that
both exert a relevant inﬂuence, however, when individuals face a chronic
disease, the higher the dominance of expert inducement and the lower the
inﬂuence of brand loyalty. Furthermore, when faced with a chronic disease,
individuals become more price inelastic.
5.2 Interaction Models: Demand Segmentation
As stated before, if we want to include socio-economic variables in the es-
timation model, we have to use interactions with choice attributes. Using
those interactions, we are able to explore demand segmentation (clustering).
In order to identify signiﬁcant clusters, we proceed as follows: we conduct
likelihood ratio tests and we only accept those restricted models in which the
interactions of a socio-economic variable with all the choice attributes are
accepted. In those cases, we estimate several diﬀerent models, one for each
32demand segment (i.e. if sex is signiﬁc a n t ,w ee s t i m a t eam o d e lf o rm a l e sa n d
another one for females).
The ﬁrst interaction we analyze is the characteristic of having or not high
blood cholesterol, however we can not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that those
individuals with a cardiovascular risk factor exhibit drug purchase habits
which are diﬀerent from those of the rest of the population. Afterwards,
we check other segmentations using socio-economic characteristics such as
sex, age, income, education level and other factors. We can only accept the
restricted models for age and education level.
Now, we estimate the main-eﬀects model for each AGE category (20-34
years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old and 55-65 years old):
Uij= αiGENERICj∗AGE + µiARDINEj∗AGE + βiLABj∗AGE + γiPRICEj∗AGE
+δiPHYSICIANj∗AGE + ηiPHARMA j∗AGE + θiBLANKj∗AGE + εij
(12)
Table 2.14 shows that the old ﬁrmly trust incumbent brands and doctor’s
prescription; on the contrary, those in the youngest age category are easily
inﬂuenced by pharmacist’s recommendation and, despite not being loyal to
established brands, they value laboratory reputation. People from 55 to 65
years old are also more price inelastic probably because they value health
more than the youngest.
Amoxiciline
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
GENERIC -0.18 0.13 -0.50*** 0.15 -0.37*** 0.14 -0.48*** 0.16
ARDINE -0.33** 0.17 -0.36* 0.20 -0.09 0.19 -0.21 0.22
LAB -0.20* 0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.19 0.14
PRICE -0.05*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01
PHYSICIAN 0.73*** 0.12 0.88*** 0.14 1.07*** 0.13 1.27*** 0.16
PHARMA 0.34*** 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.32*** 0.12 0.32** 0.14
BLANK -1.66*** 0.20 -1.67*** 0.24 -1.11*** 0.22 -1.43*** 0.26
Number of Observations  1904 1372 1610 1190
Log Likelihood -549.39 -399.43 -471.09 -330.96
Pseudo R2 0.1562 0.1486 0.1443 0.1867
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
20-34 years old 35-44 years old 45-54 years old 55-65 years old
Table 2.14. Age Clustering
Table 2.15 shows that the more highly-educated people (secondary and
university studies) value Clamoxyl less than those with a lower level of educa-
tion but that they value laboratory reputation more than those with a lower
level of education. Furthermore, highly-educated people value pharmacist’s
33recommendation more than people with a lower level of education.
Uij= αiGENERICj∗EDU + µiARDINEj∗EDU + βiLABj∗EDU + γiPRICEj∗EDU
+δiPHYSICIANj∗EDU + ηiPHARMAj∗EDU + θiBLANKj∗EDU + εij
(13)
Amoxiciline
Variable Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
GENERIC -0.54*** 0.13 -0.29*** 0.08
ARDINE -0.31* 0.18 -0.24** 0.11
LAB -0.07 0.11 -0.13* 0.07
PRICE -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.00
PHYSICIAN 0.93*** 0.12 0.96*** 0.08
PHARMA 0.12 0.12 0.38*** 0.07
BLANK -1.38*** 0.21 -1.48*** 0.13
Number of Observations  1750 4354
Log Likelihood -518.3 -1250.06
Pseudo R2 0.1339 0.1604
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
Low-educated High-educated 
Table 2.15. Education Clustering
One of the most signiﬁcant results is the segmentation between those
respondents with high switching costs, that is, those that have never tested
a generic drug and those with low switching costs, that is, those that have
bought generic versions at least one. We ﬁnd that those patients exhibiting
high switching costs place blind trust in a doctor’s opinion and are reluctant
to switch to drugs other than the established one. On the contrary, those
that have already tested and learnt about generics are more easily inﬂuenced
by a pharmacist’s recommendation and laboratory reputation.
Uij= αiGENERICj∗GEN + µiARDINEj∗GEN + βiLABj∗GEN + γiPRICEj∗GEN
+δiPHYSICIANj∗GEN + ηiPHARMA j∗GEN + θiBLANKj∗GEN + εij
(14)
34Amoxiciline
Variable Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
GENERIC -0.02 0.10 -0.72*** 0.10
ARDINE -0.28** 0.13 -0.25* 0.13
LAB -0.15* 0.09 -0.06 0.08
PRICE -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01
PHYSICIAN 0.79*** 0.10 1.14*** 0.09
PHARMACIST 0.37*** 0.09 0.18** 0.08
BLANK -1.19*** 0.16 -1.75*** 0.16
Number of Observations  2786 3332
Log Likelihood -827.69 -930.27
Pseudo R2 0.1312 0.1836
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
Have ALREADY Bought Generic 
Drugs
Have NEVER Bought Generic 
Drugs
Table 2.16. Switching Costs
It seems to be a general behavior pattern: those that are loyal to commer-
cial brand usually value physicians prescription the most and those that are
not loyal to brand-name drug value laboratory reputation and a pharmacists
recommendation. We also examined the correlation between socio-economic
variables. Table 2.17 shows that correlation between age and education level
is -0.26 and correlation between age and the variable ”have bought generics”
is -0.01. Under no circumstances, can we conclude that a correlation problem
exists among explanatory variables.
Table 2.17. Correlation Matrix
In this section, we only show the most relevant demand clustering for
research purposes; however, the marketing department of pharmaceutical
companies should be interested in applying a K-Means Cluster analysis. In
35this approach, one uses cluster analysis to group subjects according to some
measure of distance, relatedness or similarity between vectors of coeﬃcients.
Once clusters or segments are identiﬁed, one normally tests whether the
segments diﬀer signiﬁcantly on various segmentation measures of interest.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Despite the importance of supplier inducement and brand loyalty in the drug
purchasing process, little empirical evidence is to be found with regard to
the inﬂuence of these factors in the process by which patients decide between
commercial drugs at the chemist’s. Under the new scenario of easier access
to information, patients are becoming more demanding and may even go as
far as questioning their physicians’ prescription. Furthermore, new regula-
tion also encourages patients to adopt an active role in the decision between
brand-name and generic drugs. In this sense, healthcare systems are going
through a transition from a physician-directed system to a patient-directed
one. Therefore, the new pharmaceutical framework makes the analysis of
patient preferences interesting, however the empirical literature on pharma-
ceuticals demand is very limited and has always been focused on the behavior
of either physicians or pharmacists. Furthermore, all of them use revealed
preference data to estimate the objective utility function
On the contrary, this paper directly focuses on consumers’ preferences
using stated preference data obtained from a choice survey. For this purpose,
we carried out two diﬀerent choice modeling experiments -one referring to a
c o m m o ni n f e c t i o na n dt h eo t h e rt oac h r o n i cd i s e a s e -w i t ht h ea i mo fs e e i n g
whether the degree of illness awareness could modify consumers’ decision.
The ”main eﬀects” model shows the signiﬁcant importance of experts’
inducement -although physician’s prescription is always more reliable than
pharmacist’s recommendation- and, to what extent, both brand loyalty and
laboratory reputation inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision. We also found that, when
individuals face a chronic disease, the higher the dominance of the expert
inducement and the lower the inﬂuence of brand loyalty. Furthermore, when
faced with a chronic disease, individuals become more price inelastic.
Using interactions between choice attributes and characteristics of the
respondents, I found that age is a relevant variable in the decision between
a brand-name and a generic drug at the chemist’s. The old ﬁrmly trust
incumbent brands and doctor’s prescription; on the contrary, those in the
36youngest category are easily inﬂuenced by a pharmacist’s recommendation
and, despite not being loyal to incumbent brands, they value laboratory
reputation. In addition to this, those patients exhibiting high switching costs
ﬁrmly trust doctor’s opinion and are reluctant to switch to drugs other than
the incumbent. On the contrary, those that have already tested and learnt
about generics are more easily inﬂuenced by a pharmacist’s recommendation
and laboratory reputation.
Another signiﬁcant implication derived from our results has to do with
pharmaceuticals public policy, such as the Generic Paradox. Since generic
drugs are generally equivalent and priced lower than their brand-name coun-
terparts, they are expected to entail substantial savings for both National
Health Systems and ﬁnal consumers. However, despite the a priori advan-
tages of generic drugs, their penetration rate does not catch up with the
market share of those branded drugs with the same active ingredient. One
possible interpretation of this situation is the rise of uncertainty among pa-
tients. According to our results, both physicians and pharmacists exert an
important inﬂuence on patients’ decisions, therefore, they become key agents
in the learning process by which consumers accept generic versions as a fea-
sible alternative.
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40Appendix A. Guideline for a Focus Group on Phar-
maceutical Drugs
Focus groups consist of discussion sessions in which about eight people are
gathered together in order to argue about a topic of interest. The participants
are guided by a team leader or moderator who asks questions and helps the
group to be involved in a natural and free conversation among themselves.
Therefore, focus groups are aimed at encouraging participants to talk with
each other rather than answering questions directly to the moderator.Focus
groups usually have a narrow purpose which is to collect the perceptions,
feelings and opinions of consumers regarding key attributes of a product
or service. The topic of a focus group must be carefully predetermined and
based on a previous and in-depth analysis about the situation under scrutiny.
Once the purpose statement is clearly deﬁned, the process of writing a script
starts which consists of constructing a list of questions that move from general
to speciﬁc. Taking into account this overview, focus groups must also satisfy
the following particular conditions (Krueger, 1994):
• Focus groups are typically composed of six to ten people, small enough
for everyone to have an opportunity to share insights but large enough
to provide a diversity of perceptions.
• Multiple groups with similar participants are needed in order to detect
patterns and trends across groups. Intergroup heterogeneity is required.
• Participants in a same group must be reasonable homogenous and have
similar background or experience. Intragroup homogeneity is required.
• Focus groups make use of qualitative data. Results are solicited through
open-ended and ”think back” questions. It is important to avoid di-
chotomous questions.in order to force participants to talk to each other.
We conducted two diﬀerent focus groups, each composed of nine people,
in order to collect their opinion and perception about the consumption of
drugs and the entrance of generic versions into the pharmaceutical market.
Although all participants had similar education background, the ﬁrst group
was composed of older people with children while the second group was com-
posed of younger people with no family responsabilities.
1. Opening question: During this session, we are going to discuss about
pharmaceutical drugs. Just to start, I would like to know your opinion
41about the consumption of medicines.[The aim of the above question is
to determine whether participants in the discussion group are more or
less reluctant to consume chemical drug, their disposal to use domestic
and natural remedies and the practice of self-prescription, etc.]
2. What type of drugs could I ﬁnd in your medicine chest at home?; could
you let me know the commercial brand name and the laboratory of any
of them?
3. Introductory question: How do you assess the entry of generic drugs
in the pharmaceutical market? [The aim is to perceive the level of
knowledge of generic drugs and their opinion about the penetration in
the market.]
4. In your opinion, which are the main diﬀerences/similarities between a
branded drug and its generic version?
5. Transition question: What is your opinion about the information pro-
vided by the Ministry of Health and other sanitary institutions on
generics? [The aim is to notice whether ﬁnal consumers are aware
of the public advertising campaigns funded by the goverment.]
6. How do you perceive the information provided by your physician and/or
your pharmacist about generics? Remember last time you visited the
doctor, what type of medicines did he/she precribe to you? Remember
last time you bought a drug in a chemist’s; did the pharmacist advice
you to buy a cheaper but equivalent medicine?; have you suggested the
substitution of the prescribed drug by a cheaper one?
7. Key questions: In your opinion, what factors inﬂuence the ﬁnal pur-
chase decision between a branded and a generic drug with the same
chemical compound? [The aim is they mention all likely attributes and
factors that determine the demand for a generic drug, among them
price, name of the laboratory, format, prescriptor, dispensor, type of
illness, etc.]
8. How do you assess the new regulation that allows pharmacists to sub-
stitute the drugs prescribed by the physician for cheaper ones?
9. Imagine that you go to the chemist’s with your physician’s prescription
and the pharmacist gives you the chance to substitute the prescribed
42drug for a cheaper one; under what conditions are you going to accept
the substitution?; what factors would make you refuse the substitution?
10. Ending question: Do you consider we have missed any important issue?
Do not hesitate to contact me if you have additional comments and sug-
gestions. Thanks to all for your collaboration.
43Appendix B.Contingent Ranking
This appendix displays an example of a choice set used for the contingent
ranking experiment. Remember that each choice set is composed of ﬁve cards,
each representing a drug alternative, and that card number ﬁve is always the
blank card or outside option. In the case of amoxiciline, the blank card is
”home remedies” (remedios caseros).








Table 2.18 shows the questions included in our questionnaire.
Question Answer Range
Sex male, female
Spanish Nationality yes, no
Age years
Educational Level none, primary, secondary, university
Professional Level by my own, employed
Family Head yes, no
Home size number
Children yes, no
Household Net Income range
Social Security Member yes, no
Mutuality Member yes, no
Private Insurance yes, no
Household Drug Expenditure range
Generic Knowledge yes, no
Generic Purchase yes, no
Physician Generic Prescription yes, no
Pharmacist Generic Recommendation yes, no
Laboratory Identiﬁcation yes, no
Chemist’s Loyalty yes, no
Personal Identiﬁcation name, region of residence
Interview Location hospital, primary care center, chemist, others
Table 2.18. Questionnaire
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